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i i 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS RELATED TO UPCIGA'S 
ARGUMENT THAT ALUMATEK HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE 
1. The only Finding of Fact in which the trial court discussed 
settlement agreement was No. 7, which states: 
The Court finds there was an agreement dated May 6, 2003, between the 
parties that provided UPCIGA would make automatic payments of $300,000 
to R&R and Alumatek if they prevailed in the declaratory judgment action 
based upon representations by R&R and Alumatek that their damages 
greatly exceeded $300,000. This agreement is not enforceable as R&R 
failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages, 
and R&R and Alumatek must meet their burden of proof before they are 
entitled to any damages. (R. 3452) 
2. The trial court also made the following Conclusions of Law with 
regard to Alumatek and the settlement agreement: 
3. The agreement that UPCIGA would automatically pay R&R 
and Alumatek $300,000 if UPCIGA lost the declaratory judgment action is 
no longer valid as to Plaintiffs as it was based on less than accurate 
representations regarding insurance proceeds received by R&R and 
damages allegedly sustained by Alumatek. (R. 3457). 
15. Alumatek's evidence of damages is deficient because it is 
based upon projections, ratios and unfounded estimates rather than invoices 
and bills of increased costs following the fire that can be compared with 
expenses in the years following the fire if the pre-fire financial data is not 
available. (R. 3460). 
16. Alumatek's alleged loss of "operational efficiencies" is not a 
valid, objective, identifiable or well-founded basis to support any loss of 
income to Alumatek. (R. 3461). 
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18. The damage calculations of John Boekweg were not based 
upon methodologies that are a type reasonably relied upon by those in the 
accounting profession and accordingly his testimony was unpersuasive. (R. 
3461). 
19. Testimony of Patrick Kilbourne regarding the lack of damages 
was more credible and persuasive than the testimony and analysis of John 
Boekweg. (R. 3461). 
3. In the trial court's minute entry ruling on Alumatek's second 
objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it stated: 
1. Objector's request for oral argument on their objections is 
declined. The matter is ruled on rule 7 urcp. (R. 3431). 
2. The objections are denied as the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment comport with this Court's ruling . . . (R. 
3431). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE REQUIREMENT TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
DOES NOT APPLY TO ALUMATEK BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT DISPUTE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
Alumatek is not required to marshal the evidence because it does not 
dispute the trial court's findings of fact. It is well settled law that "[t]he 
marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to 
conclusions of law." (citation omitted) Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 94 P.3d 
193, 203 (Utah 2004). In UPCIGA's reply brief, it argues that Alumatek should 
be summarily dismissed because Alumtek has failed to marshal the evidence in 
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support of the findings of fact it challenges. However, UPCIGA misinterprets 
Alumatek's appeal and the trial court's Findings of Fact. 
Nowhere in the Findings of Fact did the trial court state that Alumatek 
failed to disclose information or make misrepresentations. Thus, there was no 
finding of fact for Alumatek to challenge. The only thing Finding of Fact 7 says 
about the settlement is that "there was a settlement agreement... based upon 
representations by R&R and Alumatek," and that "[t]his agreement is not 
enforceable as R&R failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost 
rent damages it now claims." Alumatek does not dispute this finding of fact or 
any other finding of fact. Alumatek challenges the trial court's conclusion of law 
that its findings of fact warranted setting aside the settlement agreement. 
UPCIGA makes this argument even though Alumatek has previously 
pointed out this deficiency in the trial court's findings of fact. Indeed, Alumatek 
objected to the trial court's first Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law because 
it did not state that the settlement should be set aside as to Alumatek. When the 
trial court produced an amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Alumatek again objected because its conclusions of law were not supported by its 
findings of fact. Nevertheless, even when Alumatek pointed out that the findings 
of fact failed to state any act or omission on the part of Alumatek that justified 
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ignoring the agreement, the court merely denied oral argument and produced a 
minute entry denying the objection because "the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment comport with the Court's ruling." This of course was 
completely unhelpful considering that Alumatek's objection was that the findings 
of fact were unclear. 
In other words, even when Alumatek essentially asked the trial court to find 
a fact supporting its conclusion, so that Alumatek could challenge it on appeal, the 
trial court basically looked the other way and denied its objection without 
clarification. Considering the absence of findings of fact with regard to Alumatek 
and Alumatek's relentless efforts to have them clarified, the marshaling 
requirement cannot apply to Alumetek, 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO SET ASIDE THE 
SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT 
INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's decision to set aside 
the settlement agreement because the trial court misapplied the law to the facts. 
The law is clear that a negotiated, written settlement agreement can only be set 
aside for "illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake." Matter of Estate 
ofChasel 725 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Utah 1986). In this case, the trial court did not 
find any of these on the part of R&R or Alumatek. Because there was no such 
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finding, the trial court's decision to set aside the agreement is not supported by 
law and must be reversed. 
In the alternative, the Court of Appeals must decide whether the allegations 
made by the trial court against Alumatek in its Conclusions of Law measure up to 
"illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake," for the purpose of setting 
aside the settlement agreement. Id. In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court 
states that (1) Alumatek made "less than accurate representations" regarding its 
damages; (2) Alumatek's damages were based on "projections, ratios and 
unfounded estimates;" (3) Alumtake's "loss of efficiencies" claim was not a "well-
founded basis" for damages; and (4) Alumatek's expert's calculations were 
"unpersuasive," and that he was less "persuasive" than UPCIGA's expert. 
The only legal basis for setting aside the agreement that even tangentially 
relates to these allegations is fraud. Moreover, in setting aside the agreement, the 
trial court relied on Quinn v. City of Kansas City, Kan., a fraud case.1 64 
F.Supp.2d 1084 (D. Kan. 1999). However, even fraud requires several elements 
that were not found by the trial court and that do not exist in this case. Among 
lrThe other case the trial court relied on was Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah 480, 40 P.720 
(1895). In the one-hundred years that have passed since that case, Utah courts have articulated 
the elements of fraud in greater detail. See ej*. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 
1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994). Although Adams is still on the books, following more recent 
decisions will likely increase the predictability that is sought in the judicial system. 
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other things, for fraud, the representation must be false and either made while the 
representing party knew it was false or recklessly knew there was insufficient 
information to make the representation, and the relying party must have reasonably 
relied on the representation in ignorance of its falsity. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. 
Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994). 
In Quinn v. City of Kansas City, Kan., these factors were present. 64 
F.Supp.2d 1084. The plaintiff knowingly lied in his deposition and the defendant 
was reasonable to rely on such statements given that they were made under oath. 
Id. Contrarily, the case at hand is different from Quinn and none of these factors 
are present, notwithstanding UPCIGA's defense of Quinn in its brief. 
The trial court did not find or conclude that Alumatek's representations 
were false. It merely stated that the representations were "less than accurate," not 
"well founded/5 and "unpersuasive." None of these are synonymous with false. 
Just because evidence is not conclusive, does not mean it is false. Rather, these 
statement merely go to whether Alumatek met its burden of proving damages 
(even though the agreement clearly stated it had no such burden as to the first 
$300,000), not whether its representations were false. 
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Moreover, because Alumatek's representations were not false, it could not 
have made them while knowing they were false. The fact that Alumatek proffered 
fact and expert testimony and calculated damages shows that it believed Alumatek 
was entitled to damages. Thus, Alumatek did not have the knowledge requirement 
to sustain a finding of fraud. 
Finally, UPCIGA negotiated the settlement. By the time negotiations 
began, the case had been litigated for over a year. As a result, UPCIGA had the 
opportunity to review all of Alumatek's financial data, depositions, and expert 
reports (including those which Judge Frederick ended up disagreeing with), and 
the expert reports that the defendant had produced. Its opportunity for review was 
further safeguarded by its own counsel and the involvement of CDR's counsel. 
At that time, UPCIGA had the opportunity to either enter a settlement 
agreement based on that information or to wait and see if the calculations and 
opinions were realized. It chose the former. Thus, it cannot be said that UPCIGA 
relied on Alumatek's representations in ignorance of their true meaning. On the 
other hand, if Judge Frederick thought the representations were unpersuasive, 
UPCIGA acted unreasonably in entering the agreement based on the same. Either 
way, Alumatek should not have to bare the burden of UPCIGA's decision. As 
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such, the allegations made by the trial court in its Conclusions of Law could not 
possibly constitute a fraud and dismissal of the agreement was incorrect. 
In sum, UPCIGA chose to rely on Alumatek's representations in entering 
the agreement without waiting to see if the calculations and opinions would be 
realized. Having done so, UPCIGA should not be allowed to ignore its contract 
because in hindsight, those calculations and opinions it chose to rely on were not 
realized. Nor should the trial court be allowed to essentially go back in time and 
substitute its decision for that of UPCIGA. Indeed, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the reasoning of Blackhurst v. TransAmerica Ins. Co.. where the Supreme 
Court declared: "[a]t the time of settlement, both parties undertook a risk that the 
resolution of the uncertainty might be unfavorable. This Court will not nullify a 
settlement contract because one of the parties would have acted differently if all 
the future outcomes had been known at the time of the agreement."2 699 P.2d 688, 
692 (Utah 1985). In accordance with Blackhurst. the Court of Appeals should 
reverse the trial court's decision to set aside the settlement agreement. 
2In UPCIGA's attempt to distinguish the cases cited in Alumatek's opening brief, 
UPCIGA failed to distinguish Blackhurst from the case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
Alumatek is not required to marshal the evidence because it does not 
dispute the trial court's findings of fact. The trial court set aside the settlement 
agreement as to Alumatek without finding facts that support such a conclusion. 
Thus, Alumatek disputes the trial court's legal conclusion that its findings of fact 
warranted setting aside the settlement agreement. Because the findings of fact 
relied on by the trial court do not constitute fraud or any other legal basis for 
invalidating the settlement agreement, the trial court was incorrect in setting it 
aside. 
Therefore, Alumatek respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals reverse 
the trial court's decision to set aside the settlement agreement and that it declare 
the agreement enforceable as a matter of law, or in the alternative, that it remand 
this case to the trial court to make findings and conclusions consistent with this 
Court's decision. 
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